was not guided by Scripture.
2 A few centuries later, John Stuart Mill, a philosopher normally given to careful parsing of concepts, nevertheless also appears to treat the two terms synonymously (or at least is indifferent to any distinction) when he asserts that the great writers of the past, espousing liberty, have relied on "freedom of conscience" to ensure that no one is accountable to another for a religious belief.
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Conscience is often treated as inseparable from religion, in other words, without any meaningful analysis of the relationship between the two. This is especially true in legal constitutional terms, where the elision usually comes at the expense of "conscience." At best then, conscience takes the form of a silent partner to religion. At worst, it is frequently ignored or unnoticed.
This need not be so. In this paper, we argue that the deliberate inclusion of "conscience" in s. 2(a) of the Charter ought to taken seriously; to do so, freedom of conscience must be recognized as an independent and robust freedom. A fully developed freedom of conscience might bring a less divisive, morality-based freedom into the foreground as the primary freedom, subsuming some forms of religious freedom within it.
Whistleblowing is an activity that seems to have some connection to conscience but not necessarily religion. If conscience is recognized as an independent freedom, separate from religion, its legal development may be best informed by an analysis of whistleblowing, and vice versa. In this article, we canvass how whistleblowing might be treated as a special form of activity that lends substance to an independent freedom of conscience under the
Charter. Without developing a fully-fledged argument that freedom of conscience should be the default freedom, encompassing religious freedom in many cases, we argue that an approach to freedom of conscience could be used for a more commonplace purpose, such as a framework for accepting and recognizing the importance of whistleblowing and lessening its stigma within society.
The paper sketches this idea out in three parts: we first briefly discuss whistleblowing and its development within a modern legal and business environment. We then explore the nature of a stand-alone legal and constitutional freedom of conscience, sketching out an argument for its singularity and importance. In the last part, we show how a revitalized freedom of conscience -distinct and separate from religious freedom -could provide a model for interpreting whistleblowing in Canada.
Whistleblowing: History and Development
Whistleblowing is an emerging sui generis field of law 4 which integrates disparate elements of the law of privacy, labour and employment, civil procedure, 5 contracts, 6 ethics, defamation, the constitutional rights of expression and conscience, 7 professional responsibility and administrative law, crimes, confidential information and privilege, business 4 The first known law school course in Canada focused entirely on the subject of whistleblowing was taught by Peter Bowal at the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario in January 2005. 5 The retaliatory civil lawsuit in defamation is a predictable response taken by the individual who is reported to have acted wrongly, to intimidate and punish whistleblowers. See, Peter Bowal, "The Whistleblower Defendants, even those with valid defences, do not often find support in summary dismissal procedures. Ontario"s summary judgment rule recently was significantly changed to encourage more litigants, such as whistleblower defendants, to dispose of actions before trial. In the recent case of Optech Inc v. Sharma (2011 ONSC 680), Justice David Brown set out a comprehensive critique of the Court"s new powers under the revised rule, positing that the costs and complexities of litigation may now actually increase. 6 One common issue is the enforceability of confidentiality clauses in the light of competing public policy interests. 7 Supra, note 1, s. 2(b) and 2(a), respectively. organizations and corporate governance, Codes of Conduct, dispute resolution and various regulatory instruments. 8 Most of these legal elements are adapted to fit and serve de facto whistleblowing scenarios, such as whether a specific employee disclosure of employer wrongdoing to the media amounts to sufficient cause for summary dismissal.
On the other hand, some forms of legal ordering aim to encourage or protect whistleblowing more generally: criminal and regulatory legislation, for example, is purposebuilt for whistleblowing activity. These types of legislation come in two forms. The first form we call embedded whistleblowing legislation, where a collection of protective provisions is contained within an existing regulatory regime. 9 There are many examples of embedded whistleblower protections in federal and provincial legislation across Canada, such as protection for employees who file complaints against their employers under human rights, occupational health and safety or environmental legislation. The second form we refer to as encompassing whistleblowing legislation. Encompassing legislation sets up a system or model to address and regulate whistleblowing in a larger, yet identifiable, sector of activity.
Examples of this form of independent, comprehensive whistleblowing legislation are the federal Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 10 and the Manitoba Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Act. 11 While less prevalent than the embedded form of legislation, 8 The history, theory and law of whistleblowing in Canada is not highly organized in academic writing to date. Much of what has been published may be found on blogs, websites and disparate incident reports. Many of the principles and issues, although not the laws themselves, are universal. To this end, see Stephen M. Kohn, Concepts and Procedures in Whistleblower Law, (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2001). The leading international not-for-profit organization, with a focus on state anti-corruption initiatives and international business is Transparency International, at http://www.transparency.org. 9 These auxiliary provisions do not "give employees the message that they are to be generalized watchdogs against organizational wrongdoing." Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near, Blowing (a) What is Whistleblowing?
As noted above, "whistleblowing" describes a phenomenon which most people generally recognize. It is, however, difficult to capture in legal terms. For one, it is sufficiently lacking in formality to carry the load of a discrete subject of law. Accordingly, whistleblowing legislation often invokes other terminology such as making "disclosures" or "reports" in the context of the "public interest" and "integrity." 19 These terms are chosen to portray the activity in a more positive light.
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There is also little consensus as to the range of whistleblowing activity that merits legal protection. A narrow view limits whistleblowing to instances where public interests in health, safety and security are in imminent peril. This early form is well represented in Ralph Nader"s 1979 definition as " . . . an act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, blows the whistle that the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity." 21 government by empowering employees to speak out without fear of reprisal when they encounter wrongdoing. Our aim is to support legislation and management practices that will provide effective protection for whistleblowers and hence occupational free speech in the workplace." Transparency International, which describes itself as "the global coalition against corruption" A more liberal approach, which we favour, integrates more completely with conscience. This broader approach defines whistleblowing as the reporting of any wrongdoing to anyone inside or outside one"s organization where any form of retaliation may be expected. It is the spectre and essence of retaliation in any form and degree which most saliently tests the limits of acting upon one"s conscience.
While whistleblowing is about disclosure, the desire to inform must also serve a socially useful function. Unwanted disclosure bears the elemental quality of an indictment in that it identifies a wrongdoing and accuses and challenges a person or an organization. The indicting disclosures are made usually because the whistleblower feels possessed of insufficient authority over the wrongdoer and of power to effect change by other means.
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Jubb"s widely-accepted definition includes this element:
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Whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto public record and is made by a person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organization, about non-trivial illegality or other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is under the control of that organization, to an external entity having potential to rectify the wrongdoing. In fact, it may be easier to define whistleblowing by its negative. As whistleblowing is anchored in verifiable wrongdoing, neither criticism nor outspoken dissent from the employer"s policies is whistleblowing, although these may be protected forms of speech under the Charter 26 or at common law. 27 Likewise, generally poor management decisions or styles and even persistent managerial incompetence would not qualify as reportable "wrongdoing" under traditional legislative and corporate policy frameworks regulating whistleblowing.
In practice, legislators and drafters of corporate whistleblowing policies define the boundaries of reportable wrongdoing and the prescribed channels of reporting. These parameters control both whistleblowing and the scope of anti-retaliation protection.
(b) The Venues and Values of Whistleblowing
If we conceive of whistleblowing as, in general, the reporting of wrongdoing, the contexts in which it may arise become equally expansive. The three principal venues in which whistleblowing may occur are the workplace, the competitive marketplace and atlarge, or qua citizen. All can interact directly with a person"s conscience. 24 In practice, whistleblowing often involves two wrongs: the original substantive wrong, and the cover-up or reprisal. 25 The whistleblowing cliché "speaking truth to power" dates to the publication of the Ultimately, regardless of the venue, we all benefit from this enhanced level of law enforcement, accountability and justice.
(c) Encouraging Whistleblowing
Given that whistleblowing has inherent private and social utility, why is it so fraught with complications and resistance? Why do most workers who observe wrongdoing not report it? 47 The standard response is fear of retaliation of some kind. Legislation relating to whistleblowing, to the extent it exists, is by nature law that prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers in stipulated conditions.
In the workplace alone, retaliation can come in essentially unlimited forms and degrees. Social shunning and ostracism, unfavourable discretion in earned performance appraisals, salary increases, promotions, desirable work and opportunities, bonuses, and perquisites are common forms of retaliation. More subtly, employees may be marginalized by restriction of information, consultation and decision-making ability. The greater the discretion held by the employer to reward and punish employees, the greater is the opportunity for workplace retaliation. In sum, employers (and it should not be overlooked, co-workers) can, intentionally or unconsciously, make life at work difficult for the whistleblower. 48 Whistleblowers may be explicitly disciplined for expressing their concerns, even where corporate policy obliges one to do so and the whistleblower acts under a sense of legal obligation. Yet, retaliation may be much more subtle and difficult to detect. 49 55 It has been shown that employees who blow the whistle externally to regulators or the media may suffer harsher discipline than those who report internally in conformity to organizational whistleblowing policies.
but they are under a legal duty, ostensibly sanctionable by discipline, to make the report of wrongdoing itself. 56 Some employees who blow the whistle in accordance with these internal management policies nevertheless may themselves face retaliation for doing so because the internal disclosure policy is viewed by management more as a public value, and less as an intended practice. 57 The policies themselves are usually written in mandatory language ("one must report . . .") but they are not mandatory in fact. In reality, publication of such policies becomes the "public" aspect, but very little is done beyond that -enforcement of the policies and investigations of reports often do not occur.
These mandatory obligations on individual whistleblowers to report wrongdoing must not be confused with the legal mandate upon organizations to implement a whistleblowing management system. In fact, while the former are becoming more common, only one instance of the latter mandate exists in Canada. Pursuant to the effect of the Sarbanes- 56 We have found that "duty to report" clauses in professional Codes and corporate workplace policies are usually unaccompanied by sanctions for failure to comply with this duty to report. We have not been able to locate a single reported enforcement proceeding in the administrative regulation of professions against a professional who was aware of and failed to report a colleague"s breach of the Code. 57 A defence along the lines of "I was just doing my job" may be successful against termination but ineffective against other more subtle forms of retaliation. to occur, a financial inducement, however modest, may vindicate the whistleblower. On the other hand, the countervailing concern is that the promise of whistleblower compensation sets up a clear moral hazard. A policy to generate reports of wrongdoing, at least in part, by financially enriching the whistleblower, creates a risk that reports will be exaggerated or unfounded because the promise of compensation overwhelms and governs one"s motives.
Where the consequences of embellishment pale in comparison to the chance of reward mischief is the likely outcome. Despite the good intentions of a policy of compensating legitimate whistleblowers, anything in the order of windfall compensation, which is what may be required for full indemnity, is expected to generate more specious reports that consume investigative resources and goodwill than factually reliable reports.
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Regardless of the increasing prevalence of legislative initiatives, protection for whistleblowers also exists at common law.
(d) Common Law: Employee Loyalty and Organizational Security
Whistleblowing must be balanced against the common law implied duties of loyalty, fidelity and good faith to organizations, such as duties owed to employers and their 82 See, for example, Edward Waitzer, "Should We Pay for Whistle-Blowing?" Financial Post (22 March 2011) FP11, and (responding) Dimitri Lascaris, "Speak Truth to Power" Financial Post (25 March 2011) FP11 83 There are many instances of this mischief described, which creates a new level of organizational discipline. In a recent case in Calgary, Alberta, a long time drug addict reported to police that four men had killed one wild horse. The men were charged with criminal offences, lost their jobs, and endured substantial debts to pay for defence counsel. Two years later, the charges were dropped when evidence showed the horse died accidentally. It appears that the tipster was motivated to file a false report by the $25,000 reward which had been offered by security, 84 and confidentiality interests. 85 Generally, even non-fiduciary employees are under a duty to refrain from deliberately acting in a way that may harm the employer"s business. 86 Competing against one"s employer, taking secret profits, setting up conflicts of interest, and divulging trade secrets or other confidential information have historically been the essence of this legal duty. 87 Most or all of these latter activities are motivated, if not accompanied, by the employee"s personal enrichment.
The same cannot be said of conscience-driven whistleblowing activity. Individuals choosing to disclose unlawful or harmful activity are unlikely to be enriched by it. A person"s conscience may motivate him to action which is not always seen by others to be in his best
interests. This is what makes the complexity of conscience-driven whistleblowing so fascinating.
Motives are relevant in the determination of which whistleblowers to protect from retaliation, and most laws and policies call for good faith disclosures. 88 The motives of the whistleblower are usually grounded in the public interest, law enforcement and justice. It is not surprising, therefore, that Canadian courts and labour arbitrators have been willing to substantially narrow the common law application of the broadly-conceived employee"s duty of loyalty and fidelity to good faith internal disclosures of actual or perceived wrongdoing. J. The duty of fidelity does not mean that the Daniel Ellsbergs and Karen Silkwoods of the world must remain silent when they discover wrongdoing occurring at their place of employment. Neither the public nor the employer"s long-term best interests are served if these employees, from fear of losing their jobs, are so intimidated that they do not bring information about wrongdoing at their place of employment to the attention of those who can correct such wrongdoing. However, the duty of fidelity does require the employee to exhaust internal "whistle-blowing" mechanisms before "going public". These internal mechanisms are designed to ensure that the employer"s reputation is not damaged by unwarranted attacks based on inaccurate information. Internal investigation provides a sound method of applying the expertise and experience of many individuals to all problems that may only concern one employee. Whistleblower laws create an exception to the usual duty of loyalty owed by employees to their employer. When applied in government, of course, the purpose is to avoid the waste of public funds or other abuse of state-conferred privileges or authority. In relation to the private sector (as here), the purpose still has a public interest focus because it aims to prevent wrongdoing "that is or is likely to result in an offence". (It is the "offence" requirement that gives the whistleblower law a public aspect and filters out more general workplace complaints.) The underlying idea is to recruit employees to assist the state in the suppression of unlawful conduct. This is done by providing employees with a measure of immunity against employer retaliation. "[R]eports from insiders allow for early detection and reduction of harm, reduce the necessity for and expense of public oversight and investigation, and may ultimately deter malfeasance" 97
The In the final analysis, the Supreme Court of Canada has, in its approach to both statutory interpretation and the common law in the context of whistleblowing, been supportive of an expansive approach to recognizing legal protections for whistleblowers.
However, we think that a potentially more effective approach could be to recognize whistleblowing as an activity deserving of constitutional protection as a matter of freedom of conscience. In order to do this, we first make the argument that freedom of conscience deserves independent status, before showing how it would apply in the context of whistleblowing.
Conscience: A Constitutionally Protected Freedom
Section 2(a) of the Charter states that everyone has freedom of conscience and religion. Undoubtedly, religion and conscience have much in common both historically and theoretically. But in a legal, constitutional sense they should be treated separately. Freedom of conscience can function as a fully realized, independent freedom, since its meaning is sufficiently distinct from "religion."
The English word "conscience" comes from the Latin term conscientia, which means knowledge within oneself, or self-knowledge. It connotes a joining of knowledge of things to self-knowledge. Conscientia first appeared in the New Testament: in particular, through the writings of the apostle Paul. In his Epistle to the Romans, for example, he noted: "wherefore
[ye] must needs be subject, not only for wrath but for conscience"s sake." 102 Originally, conscience represented a joining of an individual"s judgment to God"s knowledge of right and wrong, and a joining of self-knowledge to God"s knowledge of our thoughts and intentions. 103 Obeying one"s rulers and authority figures was thought good not just because of the fear of civil punishment associated with disobedience, but was a way to do good, through a conscience that accorded to God"s. Its English origins are thus tied strongly with Christian thought; in fact, there are no Sanskrit, Chinese or Japanese words for conscience. 104 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first English use of the word "conscience" occurred in 1225, where it was used in the moral sense of a "consciousness of right and wrong", or as the "deity within us." 105 Originally, it referred to the whole moral nature of humankind, but it gradually became personified and individualized. Further refinements followed: the OED gives Shakespeare"s example from Hamlet, in which Hamlet laments that "conscience does make Cowards of us all," 106 which, on one reading, suggests a doubting kind of conscience or the conscience that keeps us from acting as our true selves (acts, by implication, that would get us into trouble). Conscience is also used to describe an inward knowledge or consciousness, such as an internal conviction. Although both meanings derive from the self-knowledge of conscientiaa, the English word implies a moral standard of action in the mind as well as a consciousness of our actions. Conscience is thus the application of reason, employed about questions of right and wrong, and accompanied by sentiments of approval or condemnation. 107 A second, related, meaning refers to a conscientious observance or practice; the sense of a practice of, or conformity to, what is right. This meaning is commonly invoked in cases of conscientious objectors. Again, Shakespeare employs it in all these ways, sometimes meaning moral judgment, other times religious scruples and sometimes as inward reflection.
"Conscience" is often invoked as a negative, in the sense of "having something on one"s conscience," or less euphemistically tied to wrongdoing, as a "guilty conscience,"
having to "clear one"s conscience" or acting in a "fit of conscience" 108 from an existing guilty thought or deed (as Kant says, "Prudence reproaches, conscience accuses"). 109 It can also represent an institutional or individual seal of trust or authority: "the conscience of the court" or "binding on one"s conscience," which can, at its limits, be offended or astounded, as in situations that "shock the conscience."
As Wilhelm Mensching aptly describes it, conscience is the human "inner ear" for the voice which tells us what we should do and what we should leave undone, what the pattern and purpose of our lives should be. But it is more than the existence of this voice --it is the particular human ability to hear this voice within. Conscience thus acts as a warning mechanism, telling us that certain work, thoughts, feelings or acts, are wrong-headed or evil;
at other times conscience acts as a calling, urging and impelling action, words, thoughts or feelings as being right and dutiful. 110 All adult humans have this conscience within. As Paul noted, in his letter to the Romans, even "heathens" have a conscience: they have the moral law "written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the Man hath two witneffes of his thoughtes, God, and his owne confcience; God is the firft and chiefeft; and Confcience is the fecund fubordinate vnto God, bearing witness vnto God either with the man or againft him…The naturall condition or propertie of euery mans confcience is this; that in regard of authoritie and power, it is placed in the middle betweene man and God, fo as it is vnder God and yet aboue man. And this naturall condition hath two parts: the firft is the Subiection of consfcience to God and his word.114
Socrates, Jesus, Luther and Gandhi, for example, all referred to their conscience as the voice of God.
One"s conscience is also mutable. For years, Luther maintained an attitude of respect and forbearance toward the Catholic church -his conscience brooked no opposition to it. It was only as he aged and developed his own thinking on religion that his attitude changed.
Again, as with religious belief, conscience is not necessarily, to all people at all times, the Although these external voices may become internalized into one"s conscience (and they should, in some cases, in order to allow a conscience to evolve) they can act both constructively and destructively on our consciences. Since we adults all have a conscience, however, it is in our view proper to say that those who commit acts of barbarism or are evil are not devoid of conscience but are acting against conscience. The mutability of conscience is, however, one of its strengths. A conscience true to its humanity cannot remain satisfied with the status quo: "we have been given a conscience so that we can hear a voice which wants more than strict observance of the rules valid in our community or in any other group. Luther King Jr. and his non-violent resistance to segregation were led by their consciences to believe that the laws were wrong and unjust; those in the South trying to uphold the laws 115 Mensching, supra note 110 at 13. 116 Ibid at 14.
must have felt it in their conscience that the laws protected both whites and blacks alike.
Conscientious objectors feel compelled to object to military service while others may have a conscientious belief that fighting and dying for one"s country is the best path. As Mensching says, two people can arrive at opposite conclusions and yet both can be making a decision based on conscience. to be guided." 124 The great diversity of private consciences, which according to Hobbes are simply "private opinions" mean that without the public conscience of society and the law, there would be no need to obey the sovereign any more than one felt it necessary to do so.
125
In sum, as a word carrying distinct meanings, "conscience" has a strong claim to be recognized as an independent freedom with separate constitutional status from religion. It needs to be treated as more than just a synonym or substitute for religion.
Freedom of Conscience for Whistleblowers: An Approach to s. 2(a) 126
A model for understanding and assessing freedom of conscience claims for whistleblowers is based on two key points: (i) that the claim has some connection to morality; and (ii) that the strongest claims evince some form of compulsion. In addition, our model protects against abuse; in other words, floodgate concerns are acknowledged and addressed.
(a) Freedom of Conscience May Require Some Connection to Morality
Liberalism takes the moral primacy of a person as one of its most important aspects.
Each person is separate, with his or her own interests and aims, free and independent -the "unencumbered self." 127 At the heart of this individuality lie human conscience and its concomitant freedom. Individual conscience lets us act in a manner that is true to self.
Yet, if it is to have some deeper meaning -and traction, especially for purposes of legal constitutionality -freedom of conscience must be more than simply any act of a conscious or sentient mind. The need to have some moral component attached to an act is an obvious point of departure. It would seem to be difficult to imagine freedom of conscience used to backstop an argument that conscience required driving on the wrong side of the road (unless it was to avoid something alive in the way), or use a sledgehammer instead of a screwdriver to affix a hinge to a door. On the other hand, it is more plausible to accept the views of someone claiming to be a vegan because her conscience would not let her eat meat. We might even grant the same person some ground to argue that her conscience will not allow her to see other humans eat meat, although her demands upon others at this point call for deeper analysis.
In the same way that "religion" has been interpreted broadly for purposes of constitutional law, a generous interpretation of morality would make sense in the context of conscience as it appears in s. 2(a). Moral convictions and commitments could be those that result from a conscious effort to discern, hopefully after some consideration, what choices one makes about what is right rather than wrong, just rather than unjust, good rather than bad. 128 For some, there is obviously a strong connection to religion in the choices that will be made. In this broad sense, individual subjective morality seems to belong within a conscience-based legal claim; whether it is necessary or simply sufficient and how far morality can affect others is less certain.
What makes the case of vegetarianism potentially different from the choice of which lane or tool to use, is, at least for the courts, the fact that some reasonably important moral component is engaged (albeit, subjectively). We see this in the limited jurisprudence on . 132 Ibid at para 123. Of course, this observation is itself problematic. There can be deeply religious commitments about how to wash one"s hands before a meal, for example. The moral status of these practices is said to come from God; without which they could begin to look like which side of the road one should drive on. We attempt to deal with this by adding the qualifier "reasonably important" or "deeply" to indicate moral beliefs of some profundity. 133 advocating for a threshold decision based on morality in order to invoke freedom of conscience? This has a superficial attraction to it, but can also lead to confusion: washing hands before eating or prayer, for some religious adherents, is a matter of morality because it stems from a command from God. On the other hand, one can easily imagine decisions to terminate a pregnancy not based on morality -because having a child would, for example "cramp my single lifestyle," or would add to the "four children I already have and I don"t need any more".) A person"s right to choose can all too easily become any decision made consciously. So the right to choose may not relate to morality, nor does the significance or insignificance of an act necessarily point us toward its morality.
The only case in Canada in which a court relied solely on freedom of conscience to ground its decision is Maurice v. Canada (A.G) . 135 In that case, Campbell J. allowed Jack
Maurice, a non-religious inmate at a federal prison, to receive vegetarian meals on the basis that his freedom of conscience was offended by a prison regulation permitting vegetarian meals for religious reasons but no others. Unfortunately, it is unclear in Campbell J."s decision whether a moral element alone was sufficient to raise a claim of constitutionally protected freedom of conscience. His reasoning was ambiguous on this point -on one hand, it seemed as if some form of moral repugnancy or aversion was important (vegetarianism was based on the "immorality of eating meat") -but at the same time he noted that "motivation for practising vegetarianism may vary." 136 This is an important distinction. Vegetarians cite numerous reasons for avoiding eating animal products (or, in the case of vegans, using them in any way): the love of animals; the need to alleviate the willful suffering of a fellow sentient being; the health benefits of avoiding meat; the increased efficiency of a vegetarian diet; the negative environmental effects of raising livestock; the more aesthetically pleasing look of vegetables compared to muscles, wings and fat. 137 Would an independent freedom of conscience protect a person who relied on any one of these reasons? Alternatively, does it require someone to rely on only those reasons that can be considered moral? (Which might exclude the aesthetic reason for being a vegetarian?) Or does conscience require at a minimum, as Justice Campbell hinted, a connection to moral disgust? And since he shied away from invoking s. 15, it is unlikely that he relied on another potential moral ground: equality or fairness in treatment between inmates.
In sum, where conscience has been invoked as a legal freedom in Canada, it has usually required some connection to morality, although the content of that morality, and the extent of its connection, is unclear. The importance of morality will thus need to be considered in developing a conscience-based framework for adjudication.
(b) Compellable Practice
A claim that a belief or practice is based on conscience should exhibit qualities similar to those felt by adherents to religious doctrine: in many instances the practice, if avoidable at all, is only done so at great personal cost to the claimant. Thus, it is not the "still, small voice of conscience" that whispers to them, but a voice loud and insistent enough that compels some to suffer grave personal trauma, or even face incarceration, rather than fight against it. 138 The prototypical examples are Thomas More and Mahatma Gandhi, whose unbending consciences -their "moral squint" -would not let them do the easy thing, or the common sense thing, but instead cast their views against majority opinion of the day.
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Constitutionally protected conscience-based acts may also require a certain deliberateness and intent. In our view, it would be difficult to conceive of an act of conscience that is instinctual, reactive or hot-blooded. A person claiming that his conscience made him dive into the water to rescue a drowning child would not be believed. Consciencebased decisions, at least those that might engage legal protections, are more likely to be those that require time to consider, such as the inner debate one would have over whether to become a vegetarian, have an abortion, object to war or opt for euthanasia. 140 They seem to flow from an imperative, similar to religious-based actions that receive legal protection. Jews from the Nazis, that many felt they had no choice, that their actions (which in many cases threatened their own lives) were not the result of deliberation. Does this not nevertheless involve the rescuer"s conscience? I do not think my suggestion for some form of deliberation goes against her position -it seems to me that a truly instinctive reaction (diving into water) is different from "rescuing" someone from the Nazis, as the latter does not arise without warning or come completely by surprise. The time for deliberation may not be long in such cases, but it is still sufficient to engage one"s conscience. requires obligation nor whether it should be subjectively or objectively measured. In Roach, the claimants own feeling that the oath was compelled seemed to carry little weight. Given the range of views in all these cases, compellability will become a key factor in developing a framework for conscience-based whistleblowing analysis and will help address the possibility of bogus claims. Maurice was decided before the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Amselem, which held that a "nexus to religion" coupled with a "sincerity of belief" is sufficient to ground a claim of religious freedom. The actual nature of the belief is left to the subjective determination of the individual, and may, in some cases, be unreasonable. Do the same concerns arise in the case of conscience-based freedoms? Since, by definition, there is no "nexus to religion" in conscience-based freedoms, the Amselem test might just collapse into a simple requirement of sincerity in any conscience-based claim. In doing so, however, the potential for false claims increases. In Williamson, Lord Nicholls referred to the Amselem test and adapted it for a conscience-based freedom. By equating a conscience-based act with a religious one -it must be of comparable importance to practices associated with religious beliefs -he addresses the need to limit conscience"s scope in order to prevent floodgates from opening.
Of course, it must be recognized that compulsion, like morality, is somewhat indeterminate. This presents an obstacle for some whistleblowing situations. Easy are those cases we described as "mandatory whistleblowing." Most corporate policies state that employees "have a duty to report." The "compensate" and "tolerate" are more difficult, as reporting is not compelled by law or corporate policy. In these cases, the internal voice compelling a whistleblower to "do the right thing" can be strong. The compulsion is thus subjective, but it may be grounded in one or more of a number of rationales: idealism; an abiding sense of truth or honour; naivete; morality; personality; or trust. However, we feel that the varied protection offered by morality, compulsion and sincerity should alleviate most of the difficulties of using freedom of conscience to support whistleblowers. That leaves us to consider the final question: "why conscience" given the plethora of other constitutional protections offered by the Charter?
(c) Overlapping Rights and Freedoms
One strong objection to creating a fully independent freedom of conscience is that it is unnecessary, adding little to the broad scope of Charter rights and freedoms already identified and developed. Thus, the argument goes, religious and expressive freedoms (such as thought, belief and expression) under s. 2, coupled with rights to liberty and equality under ss. 7 and 15, provide a full panoply of constitutionalized human rights protection.
There are two short answers to this. Firstly, all rights and freedoms deserve as much protection as possible, in whatever form works. Secondly, and more importantly, is to turn the question around and ask why religious freedom should be singled out at the expense of a broader freedom of conscience. The advantages to broadening the freedom through the development of conscience, where appropriate, seem to be plain. The words in the Charter should all be treated with equal force. The Court then cited with approval a passage from Godbout v. Longueuil (City) that affirmed s.
7"s broad scope, containing within its ambit the "right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy" over matters which by their very nature "implicate basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence." 160 If freedom of conscience contributes little to the right to liberty in s. 7, then so does religion. One can compare the passages from Blencoe and Godbout above as if they were discussing religion.
Religious belief is something that allows one to make "inherently private choices" that go to the "core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence;" religion deals with "important and fundamental life choices" that allow one to "live his or her life" in the way he or she chooses. If s. 7 is interpreted to include the exercise of religious freedom, it would make s. 2(a) entirely redundant.
There is a need to retain all the fundamental freedoms in s. 2. They differ from the legal rights set out in s. 7 and elsewhere because freedoms, as compared to rights, recognize a positive element that respects the autonomy and individuality of all humans and permits it to flourish. Fundamental freedoms are not subject to the internal limits of s. 7"s "in accordance with fundamental justice." To argue that freedom of conscience is unnecessary due to the protection of liberty in s. 7, makes little sense unless one is prepared to accept that freedom of religion as equally unnecessary.
Mindful of these constraints, the concluding step in the argument is to elaborate a made-in-Canada approach to assessing freedom of conscience.
Conclusion
In Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada spelled out a two-stage, three-component test for establishing a freedom of religion claim. An individual must first show that he or she has a practice or belief, having a nexus with religion, which calls for a particular line of conduct, either by being objectively or subjectively obligatory or customary, or by, in general, subjectively engendering a personal connection with the divine or with the subject or object of an individual"s spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials; and (2) he or she is sincere in his or her belief. 161 Then, that the impugned contractual or legislative provision (or conduct) interferes with his or her ability to act in accordance with his or her religious beliefs in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial. 162 Our proposed approach for a broader freedom seeks only to modify this test to fit within a framework more suited to conscience. The three parts would require claimants to show, in the face of laws or conduct requiring him or her to act contrary to conscience, that
(1) he or she has a belief of a moral nature (defined broadly as described above), or a belief governing his or her perception of themselves, humankind, or nature, which either calls for a particular line of conduct that is subjectively obligatory or is a demonstrably fundamental decision that goes to the heart of who he or she is (in other words, is comparable with religious belief);
(2) he or she is sincere in his or her belief; and (3) the impugned provision (or conduct), in purpose or effect, interferes with his or her ability to act in accordance with his or her belief in a manner that is not trivial or insubstantial.
161 Amselem, supra note 129 at para 56. 162 Ibid at para 59 (emphasis in original).
Where a law imposes on such personal decisions in accordance with the above, it should be found to breach the fundamental freedom of conscience. This allows for an approach to freedom of conscience that strives to separate legitimate from illegitimate claims: arguments made by fox hunters in Countryside Alliance, 163 for example, should be able to be distinguished from those put forward by women seeking an abortion. While both take a similar formeach arise from laws that impinge on one"s ability to act on a desire -as much as anything, hunting animals feels very different from aborting a child. In our view, hunting is not something we should protect through freedom of conscience, while abortion is. Hunters are not, to our minds, engaged in an activity or behaviour that is of "comparable importance to religion." 164 Hunting is an activity easily abstained from. 165 Determining whether to have an abortion, by contrast, is a quintessentially "moral decision." Criminal prohibitions against abortion treat women as a "means to an end," denying them of their "essential humanity."
166
Hunting regulations do no such thing.
Having developed the concept of freedom of conscience, the application of it to whistleblowers is fairly straightforward. In simple terms, legitimate whistleblowers should be thought of as performing a service important enough to garner constitutional protection under freedom of conscience. The whistleblower faces many of the same obstacles and difficulties as do women who choose to abort, or those who decline to eat meat for moral reasons. Whistleblowers feel compelled to act, after difficult reflection upon the issue of the right course of action, and weighing the consequences, they usually proceed in the face of likely retaliation. As we noted earlier, it is the aspect of doing "good" or "justice" -in the face of a strong potential for retaliation, in any form and degree -which most connects 163 
Countryside Alliance and others v. HM Attorney General and others [2005] EWHC 1677 (QBD (Divisional Court)
. 164 Ibid at para 249. 165 Ibid. 166 Morgentaler, supra note 130 at para. 253.
whistleblowing with conscience. At the same time, freedom of conscience provides an effective analytical tool with which to assess genuine whistleblowing: a person who proceeds to blow the whistle without engaging in a conscience-based assessment prior to doing so,
should not be protected. The parallels with, on the one hand, hunting, and on the other, abortion and vegetarianism, are strong -a person who blows the whistle motivated by malice is little different from a person wishing to fox hunt. Neither should be able to claim that their behaviour fits our model of freedom of conscience. In contrast, a whistleblower who claims an inner compulsion to "do the right thing" by publicizing a superior"s wrongdoing, is acting much like a woman who agonizes with her spouse about the need to abort a child or the vegetarian who cannot eat meat. In those cases, the decision requires the same moral squint that allowed Gandhi to take on an entire nation. By tying whistleblowing to conscience, through adopting legislative and policy choices that engage this universal aspect of humanity, some of the concerns inherent in whistleblowing will be reduced.
A robust understanding of conscience could change the nature of the constitutional freedom envisioned under s. 2(a) of the Charter. By elevating conscience as the paramount morally-based, individual freedom, and reserving religious freedom for its more natural fit with communal practices, a uniquely Canadian approach to the problem of belief-based claims could be crafted. Since a central commitment of our Charter, as the Supreme Court of Canada noted, seeks to protect the dignity and vulnerability of all persons, and to treat all individuals as equals, a strong form of freedom of conscience would allow us to be fair in all matters of ultimate destiny, by protecting religious adherents and morally-bound nonreligious individuals alike. To rely on one"s legally-protected conscience is to assert one"s fundamental integrity and dignity, on a matter that is unconditionally serious, non-negotiable and binding. It is, in essence, religion writ small.
